

# CounterPunch

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Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair

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## The Democrats: Party of War

BY ALEXANDER COCKBURN

On November 7, 2006, the people spoke, and their clear message was: "End the war! Get out of Iraq!" The Democrats recaptured both the Senate and the House. Then they went to work – to obliterate the mandate. The House Democrats rejected Jack Murtha, the man who said "Quit Now" in 2005, as majority leader. Their leader, Nancy Pelosi, picked Silvestre Reyes as House Intelligence Committee chairman. Reyes promptly announced he wants 20,000 to 30,000 more U.S. troops to be sent to Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Democrats in the Senate gave unanimous confirmation to Robert Gates as defense secretary. Gates has a career record as one who slants intelligence to suit his bosses' political agenda. Next, the House Democrats welcomed the Iraq Study Group report of James Baker and Jim Hamilton by promptly reaffirming the Palestinian Terror Bill 2006", written by AIPAC. Then, on December 17, the Democrats' Senate leader, Harry Reid, said it was okay with him to send more troops to Iraq.

Pelosi, Reid and Emanuel are now instructing Democrats to vote some \$160 billion in the upcoming supplementary appropriation requested by Bush to pay for the war in Iraq to the end of his term. This vote is scheduled for early spring.

So now, as before, the votes that okay the money for the horror in Iraq will be bipartisan. Enough Democrats have always been available to push the bills through. Here's the record:

By 2004, when it was clear a disaster was unfolding and after Iraq's alleged WMDs had been exposed as frauds invented by U.S. and British intelligence

(Cockburn continued on page 6)

***How the "Blood" or "Conflict Diamonds" Myth Peddled by NGOs Helped a Vicious Mining Company Shore Up Its Monopoly, Made a Pile of Money for a Washington Post Reporter and Leonardo di Caprio, Served as a Propaganda Myth in the "War on Terror" and had nothing to do with Osama Bin Laden***

## Blood Diamonds: the Inside

BY R. T. NAYLOR

A few years before 9/11, the world's curiously selective conscience was shocked by images from the little West African country of Sierra Leone. There, an insurgent group fond of hacking off hands and feet with machetes funded its war by exploiting slave labor in diamond fields, smuggling gemstones via complicit dealers (Lebanese, naturally) to Liberia, then onto world markets. To horror stories from Sierra Leone (and Liberia) were soon added those from Angola, where the government was locked in a protracted battle with the UNITA guerrilla movement (created and long sustained by the CIA), and from the Congo (a.k.a. Zaire), on which neighboring countries descended in a multisided scramble for spoils after the death of its U.S.-sponsored president-for-life. What to do about African "conflict diamonds" became one of the hottest topics discussed by the New York cognoscenti as they puffed contraband Cuban cigars and sampled poached Russian caviar while seated at tables made from illegally cut Brazilian big-leaf mahogany in dining rooms embellished with looted Egyptian, Greek, and, more recently, Iraqi antiquities.

Thus, "conflict diamonds" (later reincarnated as "blood diamonds," when

the original images started to lose their shock value) were already high on the international agenda before the conveniently timed discovery that behind the trade could be found the evil hand of al-Qa'idah.

The "conflict diamonds" story actually began in Sierra Leone after World War II, when native soldiers who had been with British Special Forces returned home to find a country still under colonial rule and its leading industry still in the grip of a British monopoly. Most diamond mines produce a majority of industrial-grade stones, but in Sierra Leone almost all were (and are) gem quality and in widely dispersed alluvial fields rather than concentrated in deep mines where security is easier, as in South Africa or Botswana. Initially, the main problem was in company-run areas where miners would steal stones to sell to local merchants who would then pass them on to smugglers. But by the early 1950s more native diggers ventured into fresh territory. While the British regularly sent the police and army to try to clear illegal diggings, the miners applied skills they had learned in irregular warfare to evade capture. For every informer kept by the company in the illegal mining camps, the miners seemed

to have one in the local police.

Illegal production required a covert marketing channel. That was the role of Lebanese traders. The initial wave of Lebanese immigration into West Africa around the turn of the twentieth century had been mainly Christians fleeing economic crisis or Ottoman oppression. Their first destination was usually Marseilles, from where they hoped to move to the United States. Some, unable to get to the New World whose streets were reputedly paved with gold, ended up in West Africa, where, a little later, they found alluvial fields genuinely seeded with diamonds. Initially prominent in retail commerce and real estate, with some smuggling as a sideline, during a post-World War II diamond boom, Lebanese traders advanced digging equipment and supplies, then arranged to move the diamonds to Liberia, which had low taxes and a U.S.-dollar-based financial system.

The traffic threatened the tight control over the world rough-diamond market held by the British/South African corporation, De Beers Consolidated. Apart from feeding newspapers with claims that smuggling was sufficient to threaten the British balance of payments when the country had still not fully recovered from World War II, De Beers tried two other tricks. The first was for John Blaize, a self-proclaimed undercover agent for the International Diamond Security Organiza-

tion, De Beers's private policing affiliate, to approach a former Naval Intelligence officer, Ian Fleming, who had already published *Diamonds Are Forever*, in which the dashing decadent James Bond foils international smugglers working on behalf of Terror International. Who better to write the "true story" of the underground diamond trade than someone with the right political credentials and a proven capacity to concoct fantasies with the desired political spin?

The problem De Beers faced was that existing methods to control trafficking in West Africa were failing. Within its own mining concessions, De Beers had traditionally relied on X-rays to stop miners from stealing stones. But, as John Blaize explained to Ian Fleming, "You can't go on X-raying men, even if they're black." Another technique consisted of planting irradiated stones, then trying to pick them up with Geiger counters as miners passed the turnstiles or to trace them to buyers. That, by definition, caught only the irradiated stones – of little use if large numbers of miners lifted large numbers of gems. Nor could the company irradiate en masse – stones had to be found before they could be so treated. And presumably there might be fears of a skin-cancer epidemic among the blushing brides who were the company's primary clientele.

In the alluvial fields outside direct company control, the problem was worse. Here the company's most important technique was to plant its own agents to outbid the illicit buyers. While that permitted the company to control the output, it drove up the price and encouraged more illegal production. For a time the company combined that strategy with a buy-and-bust approach. But judges kept throwing out the cases. Most of those entrapped were amateurs, with no previous criminal history, who were lured into the traffic, then arrested in a blaze of publicity to try to scare away others. So John Blaize appealed to Fleming's patriotic, literary, and, undoubtedly, financial sentiments to help them publicize "the biggest racket being operated anywhere in the world."

According to the story served up to Fleming, the Evil Empire (at that time Atheistic Communism rather than Islamic Terrorism) ran the traffic for two purposes. One was to obtain industrial diamonds (in the face of a NATO embargo) to aid the Soviet nuclear weapons program. John Blaize assured Fleming that "our man in

East Berlin" reported that the diamonds were distributed thus: the U.S.S.R. and China each taking 25 per cent, the rest going to various places in Eastern Europe, "all presumably for the various armaments industries". This was some accomplishment given that stones from Sierra Leone were overwhelmingly gem quality, and that the U.S.S.R. was already producing so many diamonds of its own that De Beers had entered a secret agreement to sneak them onto Western markets in violation of anti-Soviet sanctions then in force.

The second purpose, so the account went, was to use gemstones to finance Arab "terrorist" activity in Syria (recently free of France), Iraq (which was shaking off the British), and Algeria (where the first shots of an insurrection against French rule had been fired). Reports of the Soviet-WMD / Arab-Terrorist plot sent a shudder through the British spook agencies, who endorsed a covert program, jointly with De Beers, to use British secret intelligence funds to infiltrate Lebanese smuggling rings, snare traders, and, where necessary, assassinate ringleaders.

Therefore, apart from alerting the public to these early "conflict diamonds", De Beers arranged for Sir Percy Sillitoe, former head of Britain's MI-5, where he had made a reputation as a commie-hunter, to be hauled from a pleasant retirement selling chocolates to spearhead the counterinsurgency. Sillitoe soon realized that the real point was to permit De Beers to consolidate its monopoly with the British taxpayer picking up the tab. Not only had the Soviet Union already discovered enormous supplies of natural diamonds in its own territory, but it was at the forefront of world synthetic-diamond research. The notion that it would buy black-market diamonds to fund guerrilla groups made no financial sense. The only traceable flow of smuggled diamonds into Arab hands ran from Christian traders of West Africa to Lebanon, then across the ceasefire line into Israel in defiance of the Arab League embargo against the Zionist state. Nonetheless, De Beers hired a Lebanese storekeeper who put together a gang of thugs and petty criminals to ambush convoys of smugglers, steal their diamonds, and collect a reward of one-third of their value.

Despite this, rising nationalism and more smuggling made the company's position increasingly difficult. Eventually its holdings were opened to state-licensed

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miners and buyers. After the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975, the established Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone were joined by more Shi'a and by an influx of Israeli smugglers, eager to find a way, independent of De Beers, to feed Israel's enormous diamond-cutting business. For a time Sierra Leone became a scene of coup and countercoup in which Israel, South Africa, Iran, and the U.S.A. manipulated clients. For De Beers the problems were complicated by developments in other alluvial producers whose rising output threatened the system by which it had long controlled the market.

Historically, De Beers acted as buyer of last resort. With cooperation from the major producers, it took off the market surplus rough stones, including (by keeping its own buyers in black-market centers) smuggled material, then resold

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to selective cutters when particular subsets of the market began to heat up. (Any broker or manufacturer not on the De Beers "sight" list had to obtain their stones off the secondary market in Antwerp or create direct links to producers, legal or illegal.) The key to control was the company's ability to carry a stockpile of several billion dollars "worth" – which also enabled it to dump selected types at strategic times to undermine any producer who tried to strike out on its own. Most major cutters were content to participate: the arrangement offered the security of steadily rising prices and they could profit indirectly from De Beers's effort to convince the buying public that diamonds were "forever". But throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, this strategy became harder to implement.

For a long time the diamond market had been a duopoly. De Beers purchased Soviet stones to commingle with others in a market-rigging ploy from which both sides profited. But in 1991 the Soviet Union disappeared, replaced by a Russia chronically short of foreign exchange and eager to establish itself as a major gemstone cutting and polishing center. New producing frontiers opened in Australia and then Canada, in neither of which De Beers held significant di-

rect ownership interest. Alluvial mining spread farther in Central and West Africa, much of it in areas controlled by rebel movements and regional warlords who were harder to deal with than corrupt or thuggish governments. Meanwhile, the world economy shifted from a generally inflationary post-World War II to a low- or zero-inflationary post-Cold War environment. In that context, De Beers's stockpile ceased to be a good investment and became a drag on the company's share price. Just when things looked blackest, along came the uproar over "conflict diamonds". In 1998, the U.N. imposed sanctions on purchase of diamonds from the UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola. Hitherto all diamonds from Angola were to be accompanied by government-issued certificates of origin. This had the happy effect of creating work for skilled forgers

and an opportunity for corrupt functionaries to commingle UNITA's diamonds with official stones. Citing difficulties of separating real from fake certificates, De Beers shut down all its buying in Angola. A short time later the U.N. imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone's gemstones, too. Zaire, wracked by civil war, was next. Ambitious NGOs kept up the pressure while the diamond trade scrambled to placate consumer countries.

The campaign had an important public sponsor. When the Canadian government heard the word "diamonds," its eyes began to sparkle, thanks to the conviction that Canada might soon account for 15–25 per cent of the world's supply of gem-quality diamonds, all, of course, certifiable as "conflict free." In some ways it was a replay of the Apartheid era, when Canadian (and Australian) gold-mining firms led demands to embargo South African gold, while the Canadian government, whose Maple Leaf gold coin was the main international competitor to South Africa's Kruggerand, heartily seconded the motion.

The last pockets of resistance to controls on "conflict diamonds" crumbled when, in 2002, the world learned that behind the traffic in "the world's most precious gemstone" stood the intensely

ascetic Osama bin Laden. Apparently al-Qa'idah had not simply been profiting from the traffic, but had rushed, after 9/11, to convert its assets into more easily hidden forms, including rough diamonds. Soon the U.N. demanded the ban not just of "conflict diamonds" but of all "illicit" stones. Member states and the diamond industry began negotiating conventions to shut out of the market not the 3 per cent of the world's gemstones that came from conflict-ridden areas of Africa but the 15–30 per cent (depending on the definition) that bypassed official marketing agencies. Smiling broadly in the wings was De Beers.

To the extent that the bans actually worked, their immediate impact was to open space for De Beers to unload onto the market identical stones from its own stockpile. That stockpile, long a drag on its finances, shot up in value, the shares of the company along with it. The drive to eliminate stones that had bypassed formal government monopolies (which almost always marketed through De Beers) enhanced the company's power. The changes in international rules came, quite conveniently, while De Beers was drastically revising its marketing strategy. Instead of just specializing in the control of rough stones to the wholesale market, it decided to sell cut and polished ones to the retail trade. Instead of spending money to advertise diamonds for the market as a whole, it decided to promote its own brand name. It began to microprint diamonds for retail with its own logo and ID numbers as a supposed guarantee that the stones were "conflict free." The claim was bogus – once cut, there is no way to confirm a stone's origin. But it gave De Beers an edge over competitors, few of whom would ever handle a "conflict diamond" but even fewer of whom would be able to convey the same assurance. The logo also promised to sooth a market spooked by the spread of sophisticated fakes, synthetics, or simulates. Not least, by downplaying the market stockpile business, De Beers hoped to ease its long-difficult relations with the United States, whose antitrust laws were a constant threat. These changes in commercial strategy were cemented into place once reporters, hungry for a scoop in alliance with NGOs eager for the spotlight, began to market the "al-Qaeda"-meets-conflict-diamonds fable.

The Lebanese dealers later claimed (probably correctly) that rumors of their

bin Laden association were spread by business rivals seeking to discredit them. Just who those rivals were can perhaps be inferred from the fact that the U.N. found a group of ex-Israeli air force pilots moving smuggled diamonds from Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia and that one of the first acts of a post-conflict government of Sierra Leone was to arrest Israeli Reserve-Colonel Yair Klein. Klein, who had won undying fame in the late 1980s for training narco-militias on behalf of Colombian drug lords, had arrived in Sierra Leone to sell “security services” to Israeli diamond traders trying to recover territory lost to the Lebanese Shi’a in an earlier round of diamond wars.

There were a few other problems with the Osama-sells-conflict-diamonds story. For one thing, how did an organization supposedly spearheaded by a Saudi “Wahhabi fundamentalist” make a breakthrough into an area where most of the population in the trade was Shi’a Muslim from Southern Lebanon? True, those intent on peddling the tale about al-Qa’idah trading in “conflict diamonds” could resurrect the “link” between al-Qa’idah and Hizbullah. But even that begged a few questions. It was never clear from any of the sensationalist stories if Hizbullah was supposed to be actually running “cells” of diamond dealers or just getting contributions from time to time from members of the Lebanese Diaspora who made money in diamonds, or real estate, or selling powdered milk and cans of tuna. Furthermore, Hizbullah was never a serious presence in West Africa.

To the extent Lebanese Shi’a in the region have any consistent political preference, it would be not for the radical Hizbullah but the far more mainstream and rival AMAL movement whose leader, Nabih Berri, was born in Sierra Leone.

In any case, participation would be interspersed in a matrix of undercover activity that would be almost impossible to unscramble. The diamond begins its commercial life in mines rife with theft; crosses borders in smugglers’ pouches or, what is often the same thing, diplomatic luggage; comes briefly into daylight again in cutting and polishing centers whose practitioners, more often than not, grant themselves a general tax exemption; re-enters underground freight channels via informal bourses where deals have traditionally been done in cash and sealed with a handshake; sneaks again

across borders to dodge import duties or excise taxes; then finally arrives in a retail marketing network replete with commercial fraud. En route the diamond may pass through the hands of impoverished diggers and backwoods traders, career criminals and corrupt functionaries, spies and insurgents, counterfeiters and money-launderers, and investment sharks and telemarketing scam artists before coming to rest around an especially elegant neck or a languorously beckoning finger – at least until some enterprising jewel thief thinks differently.

In addition, only cut and polished diamonds are really effective as capital flight vehicles. Even the most adroit trader in rough stones finds it difficult to guess their ultimate value – amateurs usually lose their shirts. If, just before 9/11, al-Qa’idah had really shifted its supposed assets from traceable forms into things like diamonds

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that were nicely anonymous and easy to move, its financial experts made a dumb move. During the later part of 2001, a glut drove down prices of some leading categories by 30 per cent. In that case, the involvement of al-Qa’idah in “conflict diamonds” is presumably something the world’s anti-terror experts ought to welcome, for it would work faster than investments in Sudanese agribusiness to deplete Osama’s fabled fortune.

Not least, the entire “conflict diamonds funding terrorism” tale misses a key point about the structure of the underground diamond business. Rarely do insurgent groups actually control diamond mining. As with virtually all other forms of contraband, they control the areas in which production occurs or across which traffic runs. Their major gain comes not from direct participation, though particular individuals might do so on their own account, but from taxation. Rebel groups manage through military power (which neither al-Qa’idah nor Hizbullah could possibly muster in sub-Saharan Africa) to

impose import and export duties, license fees, transportation surcharges and, in some cases, direct bribes for particular officers. In other words, the insurgents form the quasi-public infrastructure within which the diamond trade continues to be run by experts and industry insiders in much the same manner as before any indigenous guerrilla group began to levy their taxes, something that neither al-Qa’idah nor Hizbullah could ever in their (or CNN’s) wildest dreams hope to accomplish.

Nonetheless, the campaign was a great success. The NGOs, peddling a mishmash of half-truths, unsubstantiated rumors, and spook disinformation, got their certification schemes, which gave officials of corrupt and repressive governments a pretext to knock out independent miners and turn concessions over to kin and cronies. De Beers had its market

power confirmed. The reporter, Doug Farah of the *Washington Post*, who first broke the story, won laurels and a book contract. National security types got to reinforce their bin Laden myth.

And the U.S.A. took advantage of the tale to assign a Treasury official to work with banks in the Sahel region of Africa to disrupt terrorist operations in diamonds and in gold. On the other side, innocent people were smeared by association, with terrorism and anti-Arab stereotypes further entrenched. But that was just more unfortunate collateral damage of the sort that any war, including one on terrorism, inevitably produces. CP

This story forms the first of two parts we will be publishing from R.T. Naylor’s highly original and radical work on “Money, Myth and Misinformation”, now assembled in *Satanic Purses*, being published by McGill-Queen’s University Press. Naylor is professor of Economics at McGill.

# When Chile Lost Its Fear of the “Jakarta Solution”

BY JOANN WYPLJEWSKI

If that name – Jakarta — is memorialized at all in the U.S.A., it will be as a footnote to what Henry Luce famously dubbed “the American Century”, along with Phnom Penh, Guatemala City, Managua, Luanda, San Salvador, Dhaka, Dili; one more name in the crowded graveyard of the Cold War.

But it is not the capital city of Indonesia in 1965 that I wish to recall here, the year America’s man, Suharto, destroyed the elected government of that country, murdering 1 million people in the bargain. It is, instead, 1988, an ocean away, in Quinta Normal, Santiago, Chile.

“Jakarta,” the men there told me – they had seen the word painted on Santiago’s walls again. “Ya viene Jakarta” – they had seen that on the walls 15 year earlier, in September 1973, just before Gen. Augusto Pinochet, another friend of American presidents, destroyed the elected government of Chile, burying the elected president, Salvador Allende, and at least 2,000 others, torturing many thousands more – making good, all in all, on the threat: “Jakarta is coming.”

I was in Chile in 1988 as an international observer for the plebiscite that would ultimately say “No” to the dictator. Pinochet himself had drafted the law providing for this referendum on his rule, but that was during the terror, when he could not have imagined that, as my dear friend Andrew Kopkind once wrote, “history has a way of evading even the most ingenious plans for its cancellation.”

More than 1,000 observers from all over the world were in the country for the plebiscite, there to offer history safe passage through the water cannons and military police stationed on city streets and the tear gas hanging in the wind.

There was an electric feeling the weekend before the vote – the march of more than a million souls anticipating the tyrant’s fall, the cheekiness of a movie house that scheduled Chaplin’s “The Great Dictator” and announced it in big block letters on the marquee.

It was early October, spring in Santiago; the trees were flowering in parks where lovers met for long sojourns – as they do

throughout Latin America, because home is too tight with relatives, and hotels too expensive or too coarse.

In Quinta Normal, a working-class neighborhood where I was staying, people belonging to any one of sixteen parties in the “No” coalition were meeting openly for the first time since 1973, reviewing the responsibilities of the polling captains and others who would preside over the vote at local schools and churchyards.

In La Victoria, a neighborhood of the poor, meanwhile, people were preparing long poles of flammable rags, “mangas,” for barricades, because from the highest levels of society had come rumors – more than rumors, reports – that Pinochet might cancel the vote with armed force when it became clear he was losing.

“La alegría ya viene,” announced a slogan of the “No” coalition – “Happiness is coming.”

In the meantime, neighborhood organizers were followed and harassed: *La Nacion*, a right-wing newspaper, published the names, addresses and phone numbers of people registered with the chief opposition party; police confiscated or destroyed ID cards of “No” partisans, rendering them ineligible to vote, and shot dead a boy who had shouted “No” to a group of “Yes” demonstrators and then refused to hand over his identification.

Almost every night brought blackouts to neighborhoods like Quinta Normal and La Victoria. Opposition party leaders of the left moved out of their homes and into a series of safe houses, and “Jakarta” was once more written on city walls.

Outside the wealthiest neighborhoods – those that profited handsomely from Pinochet’s dictatorship while the income of almost half the population plunged to poverty levels and almost half the children under 10 suffered from malnutrition –the memory of 1973 remained vivid.

The men and women of Quinta Normal remembered how the general’s troops rounded up citizens into Santiago’s soccer stadium, then dumped their bodies into ditches that would later become the capital’s subway system. The matriarch of the family that hosted me recalled as if it were

yesterday the night when soldiers entered her house and took away her son; and the day when, after months of haunting jails and police stations and morgues, she finally found him in a prison, burned and beaten by the general’s men.

In the end, violence didn’t win in Chile in 1988, with the whole world watching, but Pinochet and the vipers that supported him at home and abroad didn’t lose in a way justice would have demanded either.

In Santiago on the day before the plebiscite, my group of observers was invited to a swank lunch for the Latin American delegations, elite liberals. Chileans who had been tortured after the coup and had just returned from exile were popping tranquilizers.

Brazilians, Mexicans and Argentineans were discussing whether it was possible for their countries to resist the extortionate loan repayments and restructuring demands from First World bankers that were then unraveling their economies. Fidel had not long before suggested that only a unified refusal among the indebted had a chance. These men shook their heads doubtfully;

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the risks were too high.

Bianca Jagger strained to look more than merely enticing as others from Central America reviewed the latest toll of the hot wars in their region. The revolution in Nicaragua had one more year of limping life. The Contras never would achieve a single military victory, never gain a following among the people. But by 1989 a population, exhausted from a decade of rape, kidnapping and murder at the Contras' hands and from a U.S. embargo that cost its poor country \$3 billion, would vote to replace the Sandinista government.

By the 1990s, the U.S. government would admit that it sponsored the death squads in El Salvador, where tens of thousands of civilians were killed and a million were made refugees in the 1980s. It would admit that the CIA helped plan and carry out the war in Guatemala that killed 200,000 civilians.

September 11, 1973, had hardly signaled the start of U.S. meddling in Latin America, but it is fair, I think, to say that it inaugurated the decades in which terror was re-christened as victory. For even as Pinochet lost, as his people spat on his legacy and mourned his victims; even as polite U.S. newspapers gestured to the cost of his regime – “it is alleged...”, “perhaps hundreds dead...”, “claims of torture...”, “assassination of Orlando Letelier...” – the dictator continued to be heaped with praise. Sure it was messy, his U.S. propagandists might acknowledge, but without the coup, there'd have been no “Chilean miracle”.

Now that he is finally dead, no one speaks of miracles. *The New York Times* which once toasted Pinochet, bowing to him as “president” and his regime as “government,” remembered him as “a dictator who ruled by terror,” a “symbol of human rights abuse and corruption.” Mostly the changed assessment is attributed to the years of organized pressure, the international court cases, particularly in Spain, that made him a marked man. But it was that plebiscite and its lead-up, when Chileans marched in the night banging their pots and pans, defying his police and his power, risking everything to mock them, that marked the onset of his decline. In Santiago, the day after that 1988 “No” vote, I remember joining a celebratory march that spilled out of the Catholic University and into the street – a festival of joy over a victory that would surely be compromised but was still so sweet.

And I remember running from that celebration, blinded by tear gas and frightened that, packed as we were and fleeing down a side street, the merest slip and someone would be trampled. But elsewhere others were marching, dressed in work clothes and business suits, locked at the elbows and filling the width of the streets, shouting their rejection, their fury and elation.

The next day and the next, the expressions of public happiness continued. Pinochet should never have lived so long or so well, but no one who was in Chile that October could forget or fail to honor that moment when history surprised him so decisively. CP

(Cockburn continued from page 1)

agencies and the press: HR 4613 — Final House Vote July 22, 2004: 410-12. Final Senate Vote July 22, 2004: 96-0.

In 2005, as it was clear that the US attack had spawning civil war, plus staggering corruption — HR 1268: Final House Vote May 5, 2005: 368-58. Final Senate Vote May 10, 2005: 100-0. HR 2863: Final House Vote December 19, 2005: 308-106. Final Senate Vote December 21, 2005: 93-0.

In 2006, the American people turned decisively against the war. Bush's ratings were among the lowest in presidential history. Up came HR 4939: House Vote June 13, 2006: 351-67. Senate Vote June 15, 2006: 98-1. HR 5631 — House Vote September 26, 2006: 394-22. Senate Vote September 29, 2006: 100-0.

Voices for Creative Nonviolence, joined by Veterans For Peace, have initiated the “Occupation Project” to occupy the hometown offices of Representatives and Senators who have voted money for the war.

As we warned after the election, the role of the Democrats will be to ease through a troop increase (the “surge” pushed by McCain, and Democratic Party leaders, plus the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*) in Iraq. This prediction has turned out to be 100 per cent accurate. So let's see how these Democrats, all with their eyes cocked towards 2008 and the need to hold the antiwar vote, react to the threat of being occupied. They can't afford to lose the independents, many of them antiwar, in 2008. CP

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