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From 78% to 22% to a Few Fragments: The Story of the “Land-for-Peace” Betrayal

BY KATHLEEN CHRISTISON

Henry Kissinger writes in his memoirs that on entering the Nixon administration as national security adviser in 1969, he first heard the phrase “a just and lasting peace within secure and recognized borders”. He thought the incantation so platitudinous that he accused the speaker of pulling his leg. But Kissinger quickly learned that this central tenet of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war in return for an Arab pledge of full peace and recognition, was deadly serious. The resolution had been adopted more than a year before Kissinger arrived on the scene. He thereupon played a key role in installing it, and the land-for-peace doctrine that is its centerpiece, into concrete as the basis for U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. For 25 years, the resolution remained the bedrock of all

efforts to forge a peace agreement through every subsequent U.S. administration--until President Bill Clinton arrived on the scene and until, ironically, the peace process revved up in earnest.

Clinton and his team of negotiators paid lip service to Resolution 242. But throughout seven years of peacemaking, they consistently undermined it by abandoning the land-for-peace concept that was fundamental to it. President George W. Bush and his policymakers also occasionally mention the resolution, but the Bush administration is demonstrably ignorant of the history and background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it can fairly be said that today Resolution 242 and the approach to peace that it outlined have basically been forgotten, consigned to the filing cabinets of history and remembered only by Palestinians for whom the U.S. memory loss constitutes a grave breach of contract.

This is a story of remarkable foreign policy duplicity. When Resolution 242 was negotiated and finally adopted in November 1967, a few months after Israel captured territory from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the 1967 war, President Lyndon Johnson and his policymakers were anxious primarily to ensure that Israel not be required to withdraw from captured territory, as had happened in 1956 following the Sinai campaign, without an explicit promise of peace from the Arabs. The resolution stipulated this exchange, calling for “termination of all claims or states of belligerency” and acknowledgement of all states’ (meaning in particular Israel’s) territorial integrity and “right to live in

(Palestine continued on page 4)

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Clinton and Holbrooke in East Timor

First the Butchery, Then the Flowers

BY JOSEPH NEVINS

East Timor became the first new country of this millennium on May 20 and appropriately, the Bush administration poured salt on East Timor's terrible wounds. It took the form of Bill Clinton and Richard Holbrooke, Clinton's last United Nations ambassador. Bush tapped the pair to head the U.S. delegation to East Timor's recent independence celebration.

U.S. backing for Jakarta's 1975 invasion and occupation was a decisive factor in East Timor's traumatic history, one in which Clinton and Holbrooke were key actors. Washington authorized the invasion and then proceeded to provide billions of dollars in military and economic support as well as significant diplomatic cover to Jakarta's almost 24-year occupation. Over 200,000 East Timorese—about one-third of the pre-invasion population—lost their lives as a result. The bulk of the killings in East Timor took place during the Carter “human rights” presidency. Holbrooke served as the administration's assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and as a principal architect of its policy toward East Timor.

U.N. Security Council resolutions condemned Jakarta's invasion and occupation but the Carter-Holbrooke team provided Jakarta with advanced counter-insurgency aircraft, which the Indonesian military employed to bomb and napalm the East Timorese. An Australian parliamentary report later described the period as one of “indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War II history”. Holbrooke had the sublime effrontery to claim in 1979 that “[t]he welfare of the Timorese people is the major objective of our policy toward East Timor.”

The blank check approach toward Jakarta continued in the Reagan and Bush (Sr.) administrations. Then Bill Clinton's election in 1992 served to bolster hopes. In their campaign book, *Putting People First: How We Can All Change America*, Clinton and Gore pledged that their administration would “never forge strategic relationships with dangerous, despotic regimes. It will understand that our foreign policy must promote democracy as well as stability”. In a 1992 press conference, Clinton went so far as to state that he was “very concerned about the situation in East Timor. We have ignored it so far in ways that are unconscionable”.

Upon assuming office in 1993, Clinton responded somewhat to growing grassroots and congressional pressure to limit Washington's complicity with Jakarta. Over the next few years, his administration halted the sale of small and light arms, riot-control equipment, helicopter-mounted weaponry, and armored personnel carriers to Indonesia. But it also provided over \$500 million in economic assistance over its two terms in office and sold and licensed the sales of hundreds of millions of dollars in weaponry to Jakarta.

The Clinton administration even sidestepped a ban on the provision of International Military Education and Training—one imposed by Congress in October 1992—by allowing Indonesia to buy the service instead of getting it gratis. The administration further circumvented Congress' intent and secretly provided lethal training to Indonesia's military (TNI). At least 28 training exercises in sniper tactics, urban warfare, explosives, psychological operations, and other tech-

niques took place between 1993 and 1998 in Indonesia through the Pentagon's Joint Combined Exchange Training. The primary beneficiary was the Kopassus, Indonesian units responsible for many of the worst atrocities in East Timor.

At the recent May 20 ceremony in Dili, East Timor's capital, Clinton helped to cut the ribbon on the new U.S. embassy. He was there, he proclaimed, “to make a clear and unambiguous statement that America stands behind the people of East Timor in the cause of freedom in the Pacific,” something that “is in our nation's best interest and consistent with our deepest values.” After his brief statement, the journalist Allan Nairn shouted out a question regarding Clinton's support for Indonesia's crimes in East Timor.

“I don't believe America and any of the other countries were sufficiently sensitive in the beginning . . . and for a long time before 1999, going way back to the '70s, to the suffering of the people of East Timor,” Clinton responded.

“[W]hen it became obvious to me what was really going on and that we couldn't justify not standing up for what the East Timorese wanted and for the decent treatment for them . . . I tried to make sure we had the right policy,” he continued. “I can't say that everything that we did before 1999 was right. I'm not here to defend everything we did. We never tried to sanction or support the oppression of the East Timorese.”

Of course, Clinton and the Washington political establishment had long been cognizant of “what was really going on” in occupied East Timor. And in 1999, the year he suggests that U.S. policy got on the “right” track, his administration continued to sell weapons and provide various forms of military and economic support to Jakarta.

The administration officially supported the U.N.-run referendum on the territory's political status on August 30, 1999. Yet, it did nothing meaningful in response to atrocities by the TNI and its “militia” proxies preceding the ballot and to calls by the East Timorese and various international organizations for stepped-up security measures. The resulting security breach facilitated a systematic TNI-militia campaign of revenge once the pro-independence outcome of the

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ballot was known. In approximately three weeks, they destroyed 70 percent of the territory's buildings and infrastructure, forcibly deported about 250,000 people to Indonesian West Timor, killed at least 2,000, and raped large numbers of women.

By early 1999 the Australian government had gathered intelligence proving that the TNI—including the senior command structure—was responsible for organizing, arming, and directing the militia that terrorized the East Timorese in the run-up to the vote. Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) had intercepted electronic communications showing that TNI planned to launch a campaign of terror around the time of the vote.

Given the intense levels of intelligence cooperation between the two countries—in addition to Washington's own highly advanced intelligence-gathering capabilities the Clinton White House undoubtedly had access to such information. Indeed, a U.S. National Security Agency liaison officer is always in the DSD headquarters in Canberra. Nevertheless, the administration failed to threaten a cut off of economic and military aid as a preventative measure. It even refused to issue a presidential statement warning Jakarta of the dangers of not complying with its obligations to ensure security for the U.N. ballot.

Instead, Clinton and company made meaningless statements calling upon the TNI to rein in the militia and to establish control over supposed "rogue element". As late as September 8, 1999, by which time much of East Timor had been burnt to the ground and large numbers slaughtered, senior administration officials were still calling upon Gen. Wiranto, the TNI head, to replace "bad" troops with ones loyal to Jakarta's political leadership.

Rapidly rising grassroot and congressional pressures soon made such posturing untenable. In addition, according to Nobel laureate José Ramos-Horta, the Portuguese government had threatened to pull its troops out of Kosovo and to withdraw from NATO unless Washington supported international intervention in East Timor. To show its seriousness, Lisbon denied permission for 16 U.S. military flights over the Azores.

Finally, on Sept. 11—one week into the TNI's final rampage—Clinton ended all support for Indonesia's military. Washington's ambassador to Jakarta, Stapleton Roy, had explained a few days earlier why Clinton was so resistant to stopping support for Indonesia. "The dilemma is that

Indonesia matters and East Timor doesn't," he said.

Almost none of this history of U.S. complicity made into the corporate press coverage related to East Timor's independence. With the exception of an excellent op-ed in The Baltimore Sun and an outstanding article in the International Herald Tribune, no major U.S. newspaper provided anything approaching a full picture of the U.S. role in Indonesia's crimes in East Timor. While The New York Times carried an editorial that mentioned Ford and Kissinger's explicit authorization for the invasion, it said nothing of the next 23-plus years of American complicity. The Boston Globe did the same, while also criticizing Clinton for "failing to prevent or stop in time the vengeful campaign of murder, rape, and destruction that Indonesian military officers loosed upon the East Timorese," but not for helping to sustain that same military.

A few other major papers did mention the U.S. role, but grossly misrepresented it. A Los Angeles Times op-ed for May 19 spoke of "few objections" from Washington in the face of Indonesia's 1975 invasion. And along with The Washington

ess. The "international community"—shorthand for the handful of powerful countries (especially the United States) that shape international relations—has made it clear that it will not support the establishment of any sort of international tribunal for East Timor.

Although former resistance leaders like Xanana Gusmão (now the country's president) and José Ramos-Horta (now the foreign minister) have spoken forcefully in the past about the need for accountability for their country's plight, they almost never mention it now, instead stressing the need for "reconciliation" and to concentrate on the future.

Some leaders in East Timor are trying to ensure that "reconciliation" does not become a substitute for justice. Yayasan HAK, East Timor's premier human rights organization, issued a statement on independence day that characterized "[t]he resistance of the international community of nations and the United Nations to an international tribunal" as "symptomatic of the problems facing East Timor today. Some of our own leaders, in seeing this resistance, have dropped the demand for an international tribunal for fear of anger-

The dilemma is that Indonesia matters and East Timor doesn't," said the US Ambassador.

Post, the Times reported the next day on Clinton's comment about the U.S. not having been as "sensitive" as it should have been, but said nothing more. A Chicago Tribune editorial also alluded to Clinton's pathetic statement, which it favorably characterized as having "added some closure" to East Timor's bloody past. As for the rest of the major newspapers, they were silent about such matters. And all (with the exception of The Baltimore Sun op-ed) were mute about the need to ensure accountability by Jakarta and Washington for East Timor's suffering.

East Timor's political leadership was also silent. But this is understandable. As a U.N. Development Program report recently documented, East Timor is one of the world's 20 poorest countries. It also has as a neighbor an Indonesia still dominated by a hostile military, one that, despite its myriad crimes against humanity in East Timor, will most likely not be held accountable in any sort of judicial proc-

ing donor governments," it continued. "Even our own leaders feed us nonsense about 'forgetting the past and looking to the future.'"

In his final words in response to Nairn's question, Clinton stated that "I think the right thing to do is to do what the leaders of East Timor said. They want to look forward, you want to look backward. I'm going to stick with the leaders. You want to look backward. Have at it, but you'll have to have help from someone else."

For the sake of East Timor's people, for others throughout the world who face the direct or indirect violence of Washington, and for our own sake, we here in the United States will have to be a significant part of that "someone else." CP

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peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". All this in return for Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict".

The extent of Israel's required withdrawal was deliberately not specified in the resolution — an example of "creative ambiguity" made possible by omitting the definite article in front of the phrase "territories occupied in the recent conflict". Internal documents and the rare public pronouncement make it clear that, although U.S. policymakers never definitively spelled out the exact boundary envisioned between Israel and any Arab entity, the basic assumption of successive administrations was that Israel would not keep the occupied territories. Johnson said publicly in 1968 that whatever borders were finally agreed to "should not reflect the weight of conquest". The U.S. envisioned a virtually full withdrawal on all fronts, excepting only some possible "minor border adjustments" in the 1967 lines to straighten and rationalize boundaries. In fact, on the Egyptian front, under the 1979 peace treaty, Israel withdrew totally from the occupied Sinai Peninsula — a point not lost on other Arabs still negotiating their own agreements.

With respect to the occupied West Bank, U.S. policymakers gained Jordan's acceptance of Resolution 242 on the promise that the U.S. would seek an Israeli withdrawal from the entire territory except for minor border changes. When in 1988 Jordan formally relinquished its claim to the West Bank in favor of the Palestinians (Egypt had previously given up any claim to Gaza), Palestinians assumed that the U.S. remained pledged to work for a virtually total Israeli withdrawal. This is in fact the basis on which the U.S. proceeded.

For years, a succession of U.S. administrations demanded, as a precondition for Palestinian entry into the peace process, that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally accept the UN resolution and recognize not only Israel's existence but its "right to exist". In negotiating the 1975 Sinai II accord, the agreement for a second partial Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula, Henry Kissinger, responding to Israel's fear that it would be forced to deal with the PLO as the next step in the negotiating process, added a codicil promising that the United States would not negotiate with the PLO unless it met these conditions. Two years later, President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance made a serious attempt to gain PLO acquiescence to the conditions in order to be able to bring the Palestinians into negotiations. The effort ultimately failed, largely because the PLO felt unable at the time to make these major concessions without any expectation of concessions from Israel. Palestinians specifically objected to 242 because it did not address them in national terms, referring to them only as "the refugee problem".

It would be another decade before the PLO, buoyed by the political successes of the first intifada, made what it considered to be a major compromise and finally accepted Resolution 242. In November 1988, the PLO formally relinquished all Palestinian claim to territory inside Israel's 1967 borders and, in the belief that the resolution required Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and that the United States supported such a withdrawal, declared its goal to be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, existing

Palestinians, in the form of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, with a capital in Jerusalem, following a virtually complete Israeli withdrawal.

This is not to say that all U.S. administrations supported the idea of trading land for peace to the same degree. The Reagan administration was notably unenthusiastic about working for an end to the Israeli occupation and missed several opportunities to move forward on the basis of Resolution 242. The Reagan team rejected the Fez Plan of September 1982, an initiative based on land-for-peace originated by Saudi Arabia and adopted at an Arab summit by all heads of state except one, as well as the PLO. Nonetheless, even the Reagan administration insisted on PLO adherence to Resolution 242 and agreed to open a formal U.S. dialogue with the PLO when the organization accepted the resolution in 1988.

As late as the first Bush administration, policymakers regularly reaffirmed Resolution 242 as the basis for a peace settlement

The myth of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's "generous offer" has created the misapprehension that Yasir Arafat rejected, without even offering a counter-proposal, an extremely good deal.

alongside Israel, with a shared capital in Jerusalem. In a formal public statement, PLO leader Yasir Arafat recognized Israel's "right to exist" at the same time. The Palestinians thus relinquished claim to 78 percent of Palestine, demanding independent statehood only in the remaining 22 percent. Three years after this, and only because of their acceptance of 242, Palestinians were included for the first time in peace negotiations, participating as part of the Jordanian delegation to the Madrid peace conference in October 1991.

The principal point to be emphasized across these two decades of fitful negotiations is that the United States, through six administrations from Johnson to George H. W. Bush, consistently adhered to Resolution 242, explicitly endorsed its central land-for-peace thesis, and therefore explicitly led the PLO to believe that Palestinian adherence to the resolution and an expressed willingness to live in peace with Israel would bring U.S. support for the other half of the deal — land for the

and specified U.S. support for an end to Israel's occupation. In an official letter of assurance given to the Palestinians in advance of the 1991 Madrid peace conference, Secretary of State James Baker asserted the U.S. belief that "a comprehensive peace must be grounded in" Resolution 242 and "the principle of territory for peace". Baker further pledged that "the United States believes that there should be an end to the Israeli occupation". Bush senior himself, in a rare instance of a president venturing publicly into the political minefield of the occupied territories, affirmed in 1990 that the U.S. did not support the establishment of Israeli settlements in either the West Bank or East Jerusalem.

The long and the short of this extended chapter in U.S. diplomacy is that, after being beaten about the head and shoulders for years about the need to accept the UN resolution and recognize Israel's right to exist, Palestinians had every reason to expect that the U.S. would follow through with its part of the bargain when they did

finally accede to these demands — first in 1988, then again in 1991 when they accepted the terms for entering peace talks at Madrid, and yet again in 1993 when they negotiated and signed on to the Oslo accords. The terms of the Oslo agreement, signed on the White House lawn with much pomp and ceremony under the complacent eye of President Bill Clinton, specified that negotiations would “lead to the implementation of” Resolution 242.

It soon became clear that Clinton and his team of negotiators — led by Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, who served at different times during Clinton’s terms on the National Security Council staff, as ambassador to Israel, and as deputy assistant secretary of state — had dramatically altered the game plan. Having obtained a Palestinian commitment to full peace, including not only recognition of Israel’s existence inside its 1967 borders, but recognition of its “right” to exist, the U.S. dropped any requirement for full or nearly full Israeli withdrawal. The decades-long U.S. commitment to the concept of land for peace changed from a promise made to both sides to work for what each most wanted — for the Palestinians, the return of all occupied territory with the exception of minor border adjustments; for Israel, full peace and the right to live within secure borders — to a promise instead to Israel that, now that the Palestinians had already committed to full peace, Israel’s virtually full withdrawal would no longer be necessary.

Before entering government Ross and Indyk both had been connected with the pro-Israeli think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a spin-off from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the principal pro-Israel lobby organization. Ross was a senior fellow at the institute in the mid-1980s, was an adviser to the Bush presidential campaign in 1988, and served as James Baker’s senior State Department adviser on both Soviet and Middle East affairs. He stayed on as principal Middle East negotiator throughout the Clinton years and since then has returned to the Washington Institute as a senior counselor. Indyk, an Australian citizen who came to the U.S. in the 1970s and had worked for AIPAC, was the Washington Institute’s director from its creation in 1984 until he moved into the Clinton administration in 1993, an appointment that necessitated his rapid acquisition of U.S. citizenship.

The Clinton policy approach, formu-

lated largely by Ross, quickly became clear when the United States drafted a proposed Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles in mid-1993, before the Oslo agreement was adopted. The draft U.S. declaration essentially abandoned the principles behind Resolution 242. It stated as one of its fundamental points that “the two sides concur that the agreement reached between them on permanent status will constitute the implementation” of Resolution 242 in all its aspects.

Although written in the legalistic language of a diplomatic brief, the meaning of the Ross draft was clear: whatever Israel as the overwhelmingly stronger power could force the Palestinians to accept would constitute the “implementation of Resolution 242” as far as the United States was concerned. In other words, the Clinton administration now intended to treat the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem not as occupied territories but only as territories under dispute. The United States, for its part, would leave the two sides — one overwhelmingly stronger militarily and in total possession of the land in question — to negotiate a disposition of the land without any intervention by an honest broker or mediator.

The quarter-century-old bedrock U.S. policy of supporting the exchange of full peace for full withdrawal had thus been reshaped by Clinton administration policymakers to supporting the exchange of full peace for a mere partial withdrawal. The promise to the Palestinians that had always been part of the demands on them to accept Resolution 242 was abandoned without a by-your-leave by a team of U.S. negotiators whose main interest lay in guaranteeing Israel’s security and seeing to the furtherance of Israel’s interests, and by a president who may not have understood and apparently did not care about the nuances of decades of U.S. policymaking.

This failure of understanding is the primary reason the peace process collapsed at the Camp David summit in July 2000. The myth of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s “generous offer” has created the widespread misapprehension that Yasir Arafat rejected out of hand, without even offering a counterproposal, an extremely good deal that he should clearly have accepted. Arafat’s rejection supposedly proved, according to the prevailing wisdom, that the Palestinians were unwilling to conclude any deal that would allow Is-

rael to live in peace and that they were still irreconcilably opposed to Israel existence.

According to the myth, Barak’s proposal would have given the Palestinians, as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman is fond of repeating, “95 percent of the West Bank and half of Jerusalem, with all the settlements gone”. In fact, what Barak actually offered at Camp David was to withdraw from 89-90 percent of the West Bank, not 95 percent; to give the Palestinians sovereignty in a few non-contiguous neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, not half of Jerusalem; and, far from assuring that all the settlements would be gone, all such settlements housing fully 80 percent of the 200,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and 100 percent of the 170,000 settlers in East Jerusalem would become part of Israel’s sovereign territory.

The resulting Palestinian “state” would have been broken up in the West Bank into three almost completely non-contiguous sections, each connected only by a narrow thread of land and each surrounded by Israeli territory, plus Gaza. This so-called state would have been a colony, not a state — with no real independence, no ability to defend itself, no control over its borders, no control over its water resources, no easy way for its citizens to reach one section from another, and a capital made up of separate neighborhoods not contiguous to each other or to the rest of the state.

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Israel would never have agreed to live in a disjointed, indefensible state like this, but Israel and the United States thought it fine to offer this to the Palestinians. This Israeli offer, made with U.S. support and participation, turned the promise of Resolution 242 on its head.

The myth of Camp David has been almost impossible to overturn, largely because Clinton spawned it himself, blaming Arafat, and Arafat alone, for the summit's breakdown. The U.S. media quickly took a cue from Clinton, stridently de-

the West Bank and render it indefensible? When U.S. officials began to say, in the run-up to Camp David, that neither side could expect to get 100 percent of its demands, should Arafat have reminded those officials, and Israel, that the Palestinians had already formally compromised 78 percent of their demands by repeatedly recognizing Israel's right to exist and that compromise on the remaining 22 percent would necessarily be minimal? Should Arafat have been a better negotiator?

The answer is yes to all of these ques-

of land-for-peace now tends, in political discourse throughout the U.S., to be treated as a quaint anachronism, as when many commentators dismissed the significance of the recent Arab peace proposal based on Resolution 242 and land-for-peace. Only historians and Palestinians truly remember the significance of the 35-year-old resolution.

We hear much these days about how Israelis have lost trust in the Palestinians since the beginning of the intifada in September 2000. This loss of trust is undeni-

The land-for-peace betrayal stands as a shameful example of diplomatic double-dealing and is the primary reason for the perpetuation of the tragic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

nouncing Arafat, and it has now become an automatic, almost casual part of the media's mantra to observe that Arafat rejected a remarkably forthcoming Israeli offer at Camp David. Clinton and his negotiators, no doubt unwilling to assume any of the responsibility themselves for years of misguided policymaking, have continued to put out the line that everything was Arafat's fault.

Should Arafat and Palestinian negotiators have seen this betrayal coming and better prepared themselves to counter it? Should Arafat have made it clear at Camp David that Resolution 242, along with a quarter century of U.S. policy supporting land for peace, constituted his counterproposal and that, although Palestinians were prepared to negotiate minor border adjustments in the 1967 lines, they were not prepared to concede Israel's right to trisect

tions. But the fact that Arafat is not a skilled negotiator, or an adequate communicator, or even a decent leader cannot negate the right of a Palestinian nation, as laid out in Resolution 242, to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

The word "occupation" — and the concept that lay behind it, that Israel is a foreign military conqueror in temporary possession of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem — disappeared entirely from the diplomatic lexicon of the Clinton administration. President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have reintroduced the word and made occasional references to Resolution 242, but seemingly without any appreciation of what to do about the reality of occupation, and no depth of understanding of what occupation means to Palestinians. If mentioned at all, the idea

able, but in the usual one-sided, Israel-focused approach of U.S. media commentators and policymakers, the fact that this sense of betrayal goes both ways has been almost totally ignored. Palestinians have also experienced a betrayal — not only a loss of trust in Israel because it has done nothing, despite seven years of a so-called peace process, to end decades of settlement building, land confiscation, checkpoints, and house demolitions, but more significantly a loss of trust in the United States as an honest and reliable mediator prepared to address the concerns of both Israelis and Palestinians equally and prepared to carry through with long-standing diplomatic obligations. The land-for-peace betrayal stands as a shameful example of diplomatic double-dealing and is the primary reason for the perpetuation of the tragic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. CP

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